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Abstract
Several approaches to quantum gravity (QG) signal the loss of spacetime at some
level. According to spacetime functionalism, spacetime is functionally realised by a
more fundamental structure. According to one version of spacetime functionalism,
the spacetime role is specified by Ramsifying general relativity (GR). In some ap-
proaches to QG, however, there does not appear to be anything that exactly realises
the functional role defined by a Ramsey sentence for GR. The spacetime role is ap-
proximately realised. It is open to the spacetime functionalist to adopt a ‘near enough
is good enough’ attitude to functional realisation, and maintain that spacetime is func-
tionally realised nonetheless. In this paper I present a challenge for such an ‘approx-
imate’ spacetime functionalism. The challenge, in brief, is to provide an account of
how ‘close’ is close enough for approximate realisation to occur. I canvass a range of
options for spelling out a similarity relation of the relevant kind, and argue that none
are successful. In light of the challenge, I recommend giving up on the functional
realisation of spacetime. I argue, however, that even if spacetime as a whole is not
functionally realised, some of the functions of spacetime may still be performed.
Forthcoming in Synthese.
1. Introduction
Several approaches to quantum gravity (QG) signal the loss of spacetime at some level of
description.1 This has been flagged for loop quantum gravity, causal set theory, canoni-
cal quantum gravity and, to a certain extent, string theory.2 Without spacetime, such ap-
proaches face a potential threat of empirical incoherence (cf. Huggett andWüthrich 2013).
The threat arises because empirical confirmation can be linked to a certain notion of ob-
servation, one that relies on the detection of entities with a spatiotemporal location. The
concern, then, is that without spacetime it won’t be possible to conduct observations that
confirm a given approach to QG. Indeed, the very fact that we can conduct observations at
*Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University Email: samuel.baron@acu.edu.au
1Quantum Gravity is the name of a broad research program that aims to reconcile our two best physical
theories at the moment: general relativity and quantum mechanics.
2Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) make the case for loop quantum gravity, causal set theory and string
theory. For canonical quantum gravity, see Butterfield and Isham (1999); Barbour (1994). The emergent
gravity program has also been flagged as one in which spacetime is not fundamental, see Carlip (2014); Hu
(2009). See Crowther (2016) for general discussion.
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all seems to suggest that spacetime must emerge at some level. If spacetime is not recov-
erable from a theory of QG then such a theory would seem to be falsified by the mere fact
that observation occurs.3
Spacetime functionalism has been proposed as one solution to the threat of empirical
incoherence (cf. Lam and Wüthrich 2018, 2020). According to spacetime functional-
ism, spacetime is functionally realised by a more fundamental structure.4 Just as, say,
pain emerges because a certain neural structure plays the pain role; so too can we say that
spacetime emerges because some structure posited by a given approach to QG plays the
spacetime role. The empirical coherence of a given approach to QG is thus secured via the
functional realisation of spacetime by non-spatiotemporal entities.
In the case of pain, the pain role is typically specified via reference to a particular
theory of pain. So too, in the case of spacetime, the spacetime role can be specified via a
specific theory. The most obvious candidate for specifying the spacetime role is the general
theory of relativity (GR). Spacetime as described by GR, however, is widely expected
to be at best an approximate description of the physical structure posited by QG. So the
full functional role for GR may not be exactly realised. This need not spell the end of
spacetime functionalism, however. For it is open to the spacetime functionalist to adopt a
‘near enough is good enough’ attitude to functional realisation, andmaintain that spacetime
is functionally realised nonetheless.
My goal in this paper is to first pose a challenge to this ‘approximate’ spacetime func-
tionalism before suggesting a way forward. I begin, in §2, by motivating and then more
precisely formulating a version of approximate spacetime functionalism. In §3, I present
the challenge. The challenge, in brief, is to provide an account of how ‘close’ is close
enough for realisation to occur. I canvass a range of options for spelling out a similarity
relation of the relevant kind, and argue that none are successful. In light of the challenge,
I recommend giving up the functional realisation of spacetime in §4. I argue, however,
that even if spacetime as a whole is not functionally realised, some of the functions of
spacetime may still be performed, and that is enough to secure the empirical coherence of
a given approach to QG.
2. Approximate Spacetime Functionalism
According to Lam and Wüthrich, spacetime functionalism proceeds via the following two
steps:
(FR-1) The higher-level properties or entities, which are the target of the
reduction, are ‘functionalised’, that is, they are given a functional definition
in terms of their causal or functional role.
3This version of the problem focuses on location. Healey (2002) offers a related version of the problem
involving experience, and Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2019) outline related difficulties involving mental
content. See Ney (2015) for a related discussion in quantum mechanics.
4Versions of spacetime functionalism have been defended by Knox (2019), Lam and Wüthrich (2020,
2018) and Chalmers (forthcoming). An alternative to functionalism is defended by Le Bihan (2018a,b). For
critical discussion of spacetime functionalism see Le Bihan (forthcoming); Yates (2021) and for an overview
of some recent work see Crowther et al. (2020).
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(FR-2) An explanation is provided of how the lower-level properties or entities
can fill this functional role. (Lam and Wüthrich, 2018, p. 43)
Spacetime functionalism is thus modelled closely on functionalism in the philosophy of
mind. In the philosophy of mind, the standard method for conducting the first stage of the
functionalist analysis involves Ramsification: the process of producing a Ramsey sentence
for a given theory (see Lewis 1972, 1970, based on Ramsey 1931). The same method will
be applied here. To grasp the broad procedure in question, it is useful to consider the mental
state case in a bit of detail.
We start with a theory, such as a simple theory of pain. According to this theory, let us
suppose, pain is caused by pinches and punches and causes yells and yelps. We then draw
a distinction between the t-terms and the o-terms that appear within the theory. The t-terms
are typically the terms that a theory is about. They are often new terms, in the sense that
they are defined within the theory for the first time (though this is not always the case).
The o-terms, by contrast, are familiar terms that are well-defined outside the scope of the
specific theory in question and are used to define the t-terms. In the case of our simple
pain theory, the t-term is just ‘pain’, whereas the o-terms include ‘pinch’, ‘punch’, ‘yell’
and ‘yelp’ but also ‘cause’.
The t-terms in a given theory are defined both in terms of the o-terms and in terms of
one another. A theory, in general, corresponds to a single sentence that specifies each t-
term introduced by the theory, along with the o-terms that are used to define them. This is
the theoretical postulate, T (t). By replacing each of the t-terms in T (t)with free variables,
we end up with the realisation formula T (x). We can produce a Ramsey sentence for the
theory T by binding the variables in the realisation formula within the scope of one or more
quantifiers. The Ramsey sentence thus has the general form ∃xT (x).
So, to take our simple pain theory again, we produce a Ramsey sentence for that theory
by replacing the predicate ‘pain’ with a variable, bound in the scope of a quantifier. This
gives us the following: ∃x (x is caused by pinches and punches and x causes yells and
yelps). The Ramsey sentence provides an abstract characterisation of pain via a system
of relations and, importantly, eschews any mental state terms. In this way, the Ramsey
sentence defines the pain role and thereby lays down the conditions under which pain is
functionally realised. The Ramsey sentence is thus a functional characterisation of pain in
our simple pain theory.
Having isolated the functional role in this way, we can then look to another theory, and
see if it posits some n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ that plays the pain role as defined by the
simple pain theory’s Ramsey sentence. An n-tuple plays the pain role when its elements
possess each of the properties and stand in each of the relations defined by the o-terms in the
relevant Ramsey sentence. So, for instance, consider a neurophysiological theory, which
posits a range of neural states. Suppose, moreover, that there is some neural state posited by
the theory and that the presence of that state is caused by pinches and punches and causes
yells and yelps. Then it follows that there is an n-tuple of entities in the neurophysiological
theory at issue that satisfies the pain role defined by the Ramsey sentence for our simple
pain theory. We can thus conclude that the relevant neural state functionally realises pain.
We can extend the same basic picture to the case of spacetime with one important
caveat. In the pain case, the functional role defined by the Ramsey sentence is a causal
role. Pain is whatever stands in a certain set of causal relations defined by the simple
pain theory. It would be very controversial, however, to treat functionalism in the case of
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spacetime in causal terms. Whether spacetime does causal work in GR remains unclear
(see Vassallo (2020) for useful discussion). Spacetime functionalism must therefore be
understood in terms of non-causal functional roles. As Lam and Wüthrich (2018, p.42)
note, this is not a significant departure from functionalism since “functional properties
need not be exclusively characterized in causal terms”. As Polger (2007) argues, there
is good reason to adopt a view of functionalism of this kind even for the case of mental
properties.
At any rate, functionalism on the Ramsey method does not impute a requirement for
functional roles to be causal. All that matters is that t-terms can be characterised in terms
of their relations to other features within a theory, even if those relations are not causal in
nature. To apply the Ramsey method to spacetime, then, we start with a theory in which
‘spacetime’ is introduced as a t-term. Following a number of others, I will focus on GR,
though I will briefly consider some alternative functional specifications later on. I focus on
GR because it is our best available theory of spacetime (Lam and Wüthrich (2018, 2020);
Le Bihan (forthcoming); Yates (2021) take a similar line). Moreover, as Chalmers points
out, the concept of spacetime has its roots in relativity, so GR is a natural place to start. As
he puts the point:
Spacetime as understood here is an essentially theoretical concept, one that
emerges especially from the general theory of relativity. This concept can be
applied to other theories, including Newtonian theories and theories of quan-
tum gravity, but the concept itself did not exist (at least in the relevant sense)
prior to relativity. (Chalmers forthcoming)
We thus take a definition of what spacetime is within the context of GR and Ramsify
it by replacing any mention of spacetime with variables bound in the scope of quantifiers.
Exactly what the Ramsey sentence might be depends on what we take spacetime in GR to
be. This is a controversial issue but, for now at least, I will assume that spacetime in GR
can be represented by a manifold equipped with a certain metric.
The metric in GR corresponds to a metric tensor field: a mapping from a smooth man-
ifold to a fibre bundle (a mathematical object constituted by the sum total of metric tensors
associated with each point in the manifold). Each metric tensor in the field defines the
metric at a point, and thus describes both distance and curvature. The metric tensor field in
GR assigns metric tensors to points of a manifold based, in part, on the mass-energy distri-
bution. In this way, the metric tensor field and the stress-energy field together describe a
complex geometrical object that exhibits continuous, point-wise variation in metric struc-
ture. The relationship between the metric tensor field and the mass-energy distribution
is captured by the coupling relationship between the metric tensor and the stress-energy
tensor in the Einstein field equations:
Gµν + Λgµν = κTµν (1)
Where Gµν is the Einstein tensor, Λ is the cosmological constant, gµν is the metric tensor,
κ is the Einstein gravitational constant and Tµν is the stress-energy tensor.
We can thus define spacetime in terms of an isometry between a set S of physical ele-
ments and a manifold equipped with the metric field gµν . The set S can be a set of physical
distance relations, or a set of point-like physical elements, thus leaving the relational or
substantival status of spacetime open. Isometry ensures that the metric functions on S are
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the same as those on the manifold, and thus that the behaviour of the metric tensor field
specified by the field equations is preserved for the physical structure at issue. This, in
turn, ensures that the relevant physical structure exhibits the geometric structure of space-
time. To Ramsify this account we need a way of quantifying over the physical elements in
S. For this, we can use a plural quantifier ‘∃xx’. Putting this together, then, we have the
following candidate Ramsey sentence for spacetime in GR:
∃xx (the set containing xx is isometric to a manifold M equipped with the
metric tensor field gµν).
This may not be the full Ramsey sentence for GR. One might, for instance, wish to
strengthen the sentence with a general mapping requirement: namely the requirement to
preserve all functions, not just metric ones (this might be desired if, for instance, one wishes
to capture the matter field as well as the metric field in one’s functional specification). But
even if the above Ramsey sentence is not complete, it is likely to be a necessary part of the
complete sentence. The metric structure of spacetime and the manifold representation are
important aspects of what spacetime is.
I also recognise that the Ramsey-Lewis procedure for specifying the functional role for
spacetime is not the only way to develop spacetime functionalism. As Chalmers (forth-
coming) discusses, however, there are reasons to prefer it. Chief among these is that there
is no need to try and sort through the various roles that spacetime might play, and select
one or more as its necessary and sufficient features. Instead, we can simply focus on the
entire functional specification delivered by the Ramsey sentence, and use that to locate
spacetime in QG. As it turns out, however, we may be forced to adopt a more piecemeal
approach than the one Chalmers has in mind. More on this later.
In order to determine whether anything plays the spacetime role in a given theory of
QG we must see whether that theory posits anything that satisfies the conditions laid down
by the Ramsey sentence. We thus need to identify some set of entities posited by a given
approach to QG and show that it is isometric to the metric space associated with GR. For
a number of approaches to QG, however, it is unlikely that anything fits the bill exactly.
For it is widely expected that the continuous metric tensor field in GR will, at best, be
approximated by a more fundamental structure in QG.
This is expected for one prominent approach in particular, namely: loop quantum
gravity (LQG).5 The fundamental objects of study in LQG are spin-networks (see Rov-
elli 2011b; 2004). In the kinematical form of LQG, a spin-network can be modelled as a
graph in which each edge represents a three-dimensional volume of space, and each node
represents a two-dimensional spatial surface. The standard dynamical form of the theory
involves extruding the spin-network through a higher dimension. The result is the so-called
spinfoam structure (see Rovelli and Vidotto (2014)). The fundamental structure of LQG
in both its kinematical and dynamical forms is thought to be discrete. Because the met-
ric structure of GR spacetime is continuous, it can therefore only be approximated by an
underlying spinfoam.
The way that spinfoam structures approximate GR spacetime is something like the
discrete approximation of the spacetime metric yielded by the Regge (1961) calculus (cf.
Rovelli (2011a)). The Regge calculus can be used to produce a simplicial approximation
5For an overview of LQG see Rovelli (2004); Rovelli and Vidotto (2014). For overviews aimed at a more
philosophical audience, see the discussion of LQG in Huggett and Wüthrich (2013); Wüthrich (2019, 2017).
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which, while not isometric to the metric structure of spacetime, does seem to be empirically
equivalent to some spacetime models. The Regge construction involves laying down the
various elements in a simplicial complex to approximate both distance and curvature. One
way to get a feel for the idea is to consider the construction of a geodesic dome from trian-
gles. The face of each triangle is flat, and so there is no curvature to be found if we attend
to individual tiles. However, if we look down the edges where triangles meet, we can see
something that approximates curvature, though is not curvature strictly speaking. In the
case of spacetime, the Regge construction use simplexes to mimic the four-dimensional
curvature captured by the metric tensor field in much the same way. Curvature is approxi-
mated along the edges where simplexes meet—called the ‘bones’. In very broad terms, the
LQG approximation of GR metric structure involves wrapping the elements of a spinfoam
around a structure of Regge bones (see §4 of Rovelli 2011a).6
There is, however, a very important difference between the simplicial structures found
in the ordinary Regge calculus and the spinfoam structure. In the case of the ordinary
Regge calculus, we can operate on the simplexes asymptotically by making them infinitely
small and infinite in number. When we do this, there is a hope that we can recover the full
continuum structure of the GRmetric. In the case of the spinfoam structure, by contrast, we
can’t perform a similar operation. While we can treat spinfoams simplectically as networks
of tetrahedral structures “there is no limit in which the tetrahedra become infinitely small”
(Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014, p. 139). This, Rovelli and Vidotto (2014, p. 139) note, is
the “central point of LQG”: spinfoam structures display a ‘quantum’ discreteness. This
quantum discretness signals a discreteness in the fundamental physical structure of reality.
It is because of this discreteness that the spinfoam structure can only ever approximate GR
spacetime.
The connection between spinfoams and GR spacetime is further complicated by a sec-
ond feature of the spinfoam structure. The fundamental structure is thought to be in a
superposition of spinfoam states (Rovelli and Vidotto, 2014, pp. 109–110). Contrast this
with the purely classical nature of GR spacetime, which does not exhibit the same quantum
properties. The fact that spinfoams are in a superposition makes the process of recovering
GR spacetime difficult. For even if it is correct that certain spinfoams provide discrete
approximations of GR spacetime, an account is still needed of how a particular spinfoam
structure gets selected out of the quantum superposition at the fundamental level. If no
such account is forthcoming, then it may be difficult to say that spacetime is function-
ally realised by a spinfoam structure (or it may mean that it is realised many times over,
depending on how you look at it).
For present purposes, I will set aside this complication and assume for the sake of
argument that we can select a spinfoam from the underlying quantum superposition. Even
then, the matter of functional realisation is not straightforward. Since spinfoams display
quantum discreteness, they fall short of having the full suite of properties specified by a
Ramsey sentence for GR. Nonetheless, the spacetime functionalist will want to say that GR
6Rovelli (2011a) sums up this association with the Regge construction as follows:
The graphs and the two-complexes of loop gravity are essentially a description of a triangu-
lated Regge manifold. In 3d (space), the graph is the 1-skeleton of the dual to the 3d spatial
manifold with defects: loops in the graph wrap around the Regge bones. In 4d (spacetime)
the two-complex is the two-skeleton of the dual of a 4d cellular decomposition.
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spacetime is realised well-enough because the simplicial approximation of GR spacetime
is sufficiently close. The question is: how does approximate realisation of this kind work?
The approximate realisation of some functional role is not unusual for functionalism.
Indeed, a similar issue arises for mental state terms, like pain. It is likely that pain is, at
best, approximately realised by neural states in a relevant neurophysiological theory (see
Shoemaker 1981). In the case of pain, however, one may allow that pain is functionally
realised even if the conditions laid down by the Ramsey sentence for pain are not exactly
satisfied. Indeed, foreseeing this possibility, Lewis outlines some general conditions for
approximating cases. Here’s Lewis:
We might want to say that the theoretical terms name the components of
whichever n-tuple comes nearest to realizing the theory, if it comes near
enough ... Given a theory T , we might find a slightly weaker T ′, implied
by but not implying T , such that an n-tuple is a realization of T ′ if and only
if it is a near-realization of T . Then we could say that T ′, not T , is the real
term-introducing theory; everything we have been saying about T really ought
to be taken as applying to T ′ instead. T itself may be recovered as the con-
junction of T ′ with further hypotheses containing the theoretical terms already
introduced by T ′. (Lewis, 1970, p. 432)
The basic idea is that when the functional role specified by the Ramsey sentence for a theory
T is not exactly satisfied, we can still say that the t-terms in T are functionally realised so
long as (i) there is a theory T ′ which can be obtained by ‘slightly’ modifying T ; (ii) T
implies T ′ but not vice versa and (iii) the conditions laid down by the Ramsey sentence
for the modified theory T ′ are exactly satisfied by some n-tuple posited by a further theory
T∗.
A ‘near enough is good enough’ approach to functional realisation is available in the
case of spacetime as well. Lewis’s specific realisation conditions do not seem entirely
suitable for every approach to QG, however. For it is not obvious that there is a way
to ‘slightly’ modify or correct GR to produce theories that are exactly realised in those
approaches to QG that appeal to a fundamental structure that is discrete. For such theories,
what we would need, at a minimum, is a way to transform GR into a theory with a discrete
metric structure, rather than the continuous metric structure captured by the tensor field.
Now, in this vein, one might point toward certain discrete approaches to relativity, such as
the Regge calculus mentioned above, which can be used to recover some of the numerical
results of GR for particular spacetime models. It is far from clear, however, that such
approaches can be produced by ‘slightly’ modifying GR and nor is it obvious that these
approaches are implied (but do not imply) GR as Lewis’s account requires. Lewis’s account
thus appears too demanding. We may well want to say that something in a theory T is
approximately realised, even when we don’t have a way of modifying T to produce another
theory that is both exactly realised and strictly implied by the original theory.
In what follows, then, I will work with an alternative to Lewis’s approach. My alter-
native approach can be stated as follows. For any theory T with Ramsey sentence R:
1. If there is an n-tuple of entities ⟨e1 ∗ ...en∗⟩ and the en∗ exactly realise the functional
role specified by R, then the t-terms in T are realised by the en∗
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2. If there is no n-tuple of entities that exactly realises the functional role specified by
R then, if there is an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩ posited by a theory T ′ and the e′n
are sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ would exactly realise
the functional role specified by R were the en to exist, then the t-terms in T are
functionally realised by the e′n.
Under this set of realisation conditions, all that functional realisation requires is for there to
be a sufficiently close relationship between whatever would exactly realise the functional
role for a theory T and the entities posited by another theory T ′. There is no need for a
third theory T∗ that constitutes a modification or correction of T to mediate the functional
relationship between T and T ′. The proposed set of conditions is thus less demanding than
Lewis’s, at least when it comes to the relationships between theories.
Using the above realisation conditions, we can thus allow that a discrete structure in a
theory of QG functionally realises spacetime because it is sufficiently similar to whatever
would exactly realise the spacetime role, were it to exist. We can say this even when there
is no modification to GR that yields a functional specification that is exactly realised by
the theory of QG at issue. Call such a view: approximate spacetime functionalism.
3. The Challenge
My goal in this section is to raise a challenge for approximate spacetime functionalism.
The realisation conditions outlined above allow that functional realisation can occur even
when the functional role specified by the Ramsey sentence for GR is not exactly realised.
All that matters is that there is something that is sufficiently similar to an exact realiser of
the spacetime role. But how similar do the entities posited by a theory of QG need to be
to an exact realiser before we can say that functional realisation occurs? The challenge, in
brief, is to provide a plausible answer to this question. In what follows, I canvass a range
of potential accounts of the similarity relation and argue that none is satisfactory. In this
way I make a case for the seriousness of the challenge. I don’t take the challenge to be
decisive, however. There may yet be a way to specify similarity in a way that can support
approximate spacetime functionalism. I do, however, think the challenge is sufficiently
difficult to motivate finding an alternative.
In recent work, Lam andWüthrich seem to endorse some version of approximate space-
time functionalism. They acknowledge that a full functional specification for spacetime
may not be satisfied by a more fundamental theory of QG. For them, however, this doesn’t
matter. Even if the functional specification for spacetime is not exactly satisfied, so long
as that specification is satisfied well-enough, we can say that spacetime is functionally
realised. Specifically, so long as there is enough structure in a more fundamental theory
of QG to be able to accommodate the empirical evidence that supports GR, then that is
enough for functional realisation. As they put the point:
... from a functionalist point of view, nothing remains beyond showing how
the fundamental degrees of freedom can collectively behave such that they
appear spatiotemporal at macroscopic scales in all relevant and empiri-
cally testable ways. This turn out to be a hard task in quantum gravity. Func-
tionalism can be seen as the assertion that once this task is completed, no un-
finished business lingers on. (emphasis added, Lam and Wüthrich 2018, p.
44)
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We can formulate the basic idea behind Lam and Wüthrich’s version of approximate
spacetime functionalism as follows. First, let us say that a theory T ′ recaptures the em-
pirical results of a theory T when every confirmed empirical prediction of T is also an
empirical prediction of T ′ but not vice versa. We can then supplement the realisation con-
ditions detailed at the end of §2 with a third clause, [ER], that specifies the operative notion
of similarity in terms of empirical recovery. This yields the following full set of realisation
conditions. For a theory T with Ramsey sentence R:
1. If there is an n-tuple of entities ⟨e1 ∗ ...en∗⟩ and the en∗ exactly realise the functional
role specified by R, then the t-terms in T are realised by the en∗
2. If there is no n-tuple of entities that exactly realises the functional role specified by
R then, if there is an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩ posited by a theory T ′ and the e′n
are sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ would exactly realise
the functional role specified by R were the en to exist, then the t-terms in T are
functionally realised by the e′n.
3. A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩ that is sufficiently similar to what-
ever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ would exactly realise the functional role specified
by R in T just when every confirmed empirical prediction of T is an empirical pre-
diction of T ′ but not vice versa.
So, for example, spacetime in GR is functionally realised by something in LQG so long
as LQG can recapture the empirical results of GR and thus if something in LQG “appears
spatiotemporal at macroscopic scales in all relevant and empirically testable ways” (Lam
and Wüthrich, 2018, p. 44).
While initially promising, [ER] faces a problem. To see the problem, let us consider a
different example. Consider, for instance, the following three theories: quantum electro-
dynamics (QED), special relativity (SR) and a suitably sophisticated version of Lorentz’s
aether theory. SR and Lorentz’s aether theory are empirically equivalent: every confirmed
empirical prediction of SR is a prediction of the aether theory as well. Lorentz’s aether
theory, however, makes use of unobservable entities that play no role in SR. Most notably,
Lorentz’s theory posits a physical substance that permeates all of space, throughwhich light
waves propagate and that defines an absolute rest frame. No such entity is to be found in
SR. The closest thing to the aether is the electromagnetic field, which one might consider
to be aether-like, in so far as it is real and permeates all of space. However, this field does
not define an absolute rest frame. Since nothing else in SR does this work either, the aether
is absent from the theory.
Now, suppose we produce a Ramsey sentence for Lorentz’s aether theory. Exactly
what the Ramsey sentence might be is not all that important for present purposes. What
matters is that the sentence will include a t-term for the aether. The conditions laid down by
this Ramsey sentence thus won’t be exactly satisfied by anything in QED. That’s because
there is no aether in QED. Suppose, however, that we adopt the realisation conditions
outlined above, including [ER]. Then what happens? Well, because QED recovers all of
the empirical predictions of SR, and since SR and Lorentz’s aether theory are empirically
equivalent, QED manages to recover all of the empirical predictions of Lorentz’s aether
theory as well. QED thus stands in a relationship of empirical recovery to Lorentz’s aether
theory. Given [ER] it follows that there is an n-tuple in QED that is sufficiently similar to
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whatever would exactly realise Lorentz’s aether theory were it to exist. Given this, each
t-term in the Ramsey sentence for Lorentz’s aether theory—including the t-term for the
aether—manages to be realised in QED after all.
The problem is really a general problem with t-terms for unobservables. It is precisely
because the aether makes no empirical difference that SR and Lorentz’s aether theory are
empirically equivalent. Indeed, more generally, for any pair of theories T and T∗, if T and
T∗ differ only in unobservable respects, then any theory that empirically recovers T will
empirically recover T∗ as well. If we hang approximate functional realisation on empirical
recovery alone, then any realisers for the t-terms in T will also be realisers for the t-terms
in T∗.
Given the generality of the problem, it is straightforward to extend it to QG and GR.
We can do this by producing a modified version of GR that adds an unobservable aether to
that theory. Now, we have to be a bit careful here, since adding an aether to GR is likely to
produce a theory with distinct empirical consequences. Adding an aether involves adding
a rest frame, and so such a theory should predict situations in which Lorentz invariance is
broken. Adding an aether to GRwould thus likely involve undermining general covariance
which, in turn, would undermine background independence (Belot 2011, p. 2866).
Aether theories of this kind are being actively developed and they do indeed lead to em-
pirical differences at some level (see, for instance, Jacobson and Mattingly (2001)). What
I have in mind, though, is a theory that modifies one of these aetheric versions of GR by
adding a mechanism through which the aether disguises itself, and wipes out all possible
empirical evidence of Lorentz symmetry-breaking. For instance, we could imagine that
physical systems are systematically distorted when they are in motion relative to the ab-
solute rest-frame. The distortion prevents us from detecting any break-down of Lorentz
invariance and thus prevents us from detecting the aether (this is, in fact, not so far from
Lorentz’s original explanation of the null results in the Michelson-Morley experiments).
The ‘self-effacing’ aether in this modified version of GR, call it GR+, adds no empirical
consequences. GR and GR+ are thus empirically equivalent, but they have different Ram-
sey sentences. While the two Ramsey sentences both include a description of a manifold
equipped with a metric tensor field, the Ramsey sentence for GR+ includes an additional
t-term for the self-effacing aether.
If the Ramsey sentence for GR is not exactly satisfied, then the Ramsey sentence for
GR+ is not exactly satisfied either, since they both include a continuous metric field. More-
over, if a theory of QG recaptures the empirical predictions of GR, then it recaptures the
empirical predictions of GR+ as well. Given [ER], then, the conditions laid down by both
the Ramsey sentence for GR and the Ramsey sentence for GR+ are satisfied well-enough
to be able to say that the t-terms in both theories are realised by something in the more
fundamental theory of QG. But then it seems we are forced to accept that the self-effacing
aether is realised.
Now, one might try to avoid this outcome by further restricting the conditions under
which realisation occurs in the absence of an exact realiser. In the case of QG, one might
point out, there is nothing that approximates a self-effacing aether; but there is something
that approximates spacetime. What we need to do, then, is take account of specific approx-
imation relations between entities. The idea is to impose a further mapping requirement
on the n-tuple that approximately realises a given functional role. It is not enough for an
n-tuple to be globally similar to some n-tuple that would exactly realise a given functional
role, were that n-tuple to exist. Rather, each member of the approximating n-tuple must it-
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self approximate some member of an n-tuple that would exactly realise a given functional
role. One way to capture this thought is to modify [ER] as follows. For theory T with
Ramsey sentence R:
[ER*] A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩ that is sufficiently sim-
ilar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩would exactly realise the functional
role specified by R in T just when (i) every confirmed empirical prediction of
T is an empirical prediction of T ′ but not vice versa and (ii) for each en there
is some entity posited by T ′ that approximates it.
To see how [ER*] might help, consider the QED case again. While it is true that
Lorentz’s aether theory is empirically recaptured by QED, it is not the case that each mem-
ber of the n-tuple that would exactly realise the functional specification supplied by the
Ramsey sentence for Lorentz’s aether theory is mapped, via an approximation relation, to
some member of the n-tuple of entities posited by QED. In particular, there is no entity
in QED that approximates the aether. So the t-terms in Lorentz’s aether theory are not
approximately realised in QED. The same basic reasoning applies to GR+ and QG.
The difficulty with [ER*] however, is that it invokes a second notion of similarity:
an approximation relation between pairs of entities. But then we can just ask the same
question of this second notion of similarity that lead to [ER] in the first place. Namely,
how similar do two entities need to be before we can say that one approximates the other?
If we are too relaxed concerning the conditions for this second notion of similarity, then
it will make the realisation of a self-effacing aether too easy. If we are too conservative,
then it will make the realisation of spacetime too hard. It is unclear how to specify the
relevant notion of similarity to achieve the right outcome. One might try to avoid the
need to spell out the relevant notion of similarity at all by simply stating that each en is
approximated by whichever e′n is most similar to it in the underlying theory. However, this
makes realisation far too easy. For if there is no lower-bound on the relevant degree of
similarity, then anything, no matter how dissimilar, can qualify.
What we really need is an alternative to [ER] and [ER*]. Specifically, we need a way to
specify a similarity relation that doesn’t force us to recognise the realisation of unwanted,
unobservable entities. One option is to appeal to explanation. Let us say that a theory T ′
stands in a relationship of explanatory recovery to a theory T when everything that can
be explained by T can also be explained by T ′ but not vice versa. An alternative to [ER]
based on a notion of explanatory recovery can thus be stated as follows. For theory T with
Ramsey sentence R:
Explanatory Recovery [XR]A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩
that is sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ would ex-
actly realise the functional role specified by R just when everything that can
be explained by T ′ can also be explained by T but not vice versa.
The shift from [ER]/[ER*] to [XR] seems to help with the aether case. Consider Lorentz’s
aether theory once again. While SR and Lorentz’s aether theory might be empirically
equivalent, they may not be explanatorily equivalent. In particular, there may be things that
Lorentz’s aether theory can explain that SR cannot explain even though the two theories
issue in the same empirical predictions.
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Of course, we have to be a bit careful here, since there doesn’t seem to be any observ-
able fact that Lorentz’s aether theory can explain that cannot be explained equally well by
SR. But perhaps there are facts involving unobservables that are explained by the aether
theory. Broadly speaking, there are three ways that unobservables might be involved in
explanation. First, an explanation might use an unobservable to explain some observable
fact (e.g., blackholes explain the lensing of light from distant stars). Second, an explana-
tion might be given of why some unobservable fact holds (e.g., why are there blackholes?).
Third, an explanation might be provided of why a particular unobservable fact is unobserv-
able (e.g., blackholes are unobservable because they trap signals).
It seems unlikely that the aether theory provides explanations involving unobservables
of the first two kinds. No new observable facts are explained by the aether theory and
while the aether theory does include a new unobservable to be explained (the aether), there
doesn’t seem to be an explanation of this fact provided by the theory. The existence of the
aether is, in the context of the theory, a brute fact. However, there may be a new expla-
nation of the third kind given by Lorentz’s aether theory, at least if we treat the aether as
self-effacing in the sense described above. The very fact that the aether cannot be observed
is explained in terms of facts about the aether plus some further facts about the way that
movement supposedly interacts with electrostatic forces that contract or expand our mea-
suring devices. Granted, SR explains why the aether cannot be observed as well: it cannot
be observed because it does not exist. However, the explanatory situation seems slightly
different in so far as Lorentz’s theory can explain why the aether is not observed despite
the fact it exists; a fact that cannot be explained in SR.
If SR and Lorentz’s aether theory are not explanatorily equivalent, then even if QED
stands in a relationship of explanatory recovery to SR, there is no guarantee that it will
stand in the same relationship to Lorentz’s aether theory. This means that, with regard
to the aether theory at least, QED will fail to satisfy a set of realisation conditions for
approximate realisation that includes [XR]. At first glance, then, [XR] offers a way to
avoid the difficulty with [ER]/[ER*].
The difficulty, however, is not so easily dealt with. For even if an explanatory difference
between SR and Lorentz’s aether theory can be found, we can simply cook up a theory that
effectively factors out explanatory differences of the relevant kind. Consider the QG case
once again. Suppose we take GR+ and further stipulate that the ‘self-effacing’ aether does
no explanatorywork in that theory; at least, nowork that is not already donewithinGR.One
way to do this is to simply remove the explanation of why the aether cannot be observed.
Instead of treating this as a matter of distortion to measuring devices, we simply stipulate
that it is a brute fact within the theory that the aether cannot be detected. [XR] provides us
with no way to prevent the aether in GR+ so construed from being functionally realised by
a theory of QG.
One might object that this ‘brute fact’ version of GR+ is a terrible theory: one should
not posit entities that are explanatorily idle. I agree! But that’s no bar to our capacity to
formulate a theory along these lines, and it is the fact that such a theory can be formulated
that poses a problem for [XR]. Given the existence of an explanatorily idle version of GR+,
[XR] incorrectly yields the result that such a theory, and its associated t-terms (including a
t-term for the aether) are functionally realised in QG. [XR], then, is not a viable alternative
to [ER]/[ER*].
A second alternative to [ER] appeals to counterfactual dependence rather than to ex-
planation. Let us say that a theory T ′ stands in a relation of counterfactual recovery to a
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theory T when every counterfactual that is true according to T is true according to T ′ and
not vice versa. We can then say that for a theory T with Ramsey sentence R:
Counterfactual Recovery 1 [CR1] A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities
⟨e′1...e′n⟩ that is sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩
would exactly realise the functional role specified byR just when every coun-
terfactual that is true according to T is true according to T ′ and not vice versa.
Consider the following counterfactual: if the aether had not existed, light waves would
not have propagated. This counterfactual appears to be true according to Lorentz’s aether
theory. The counterfactual does not appear to be true in the context of QED. Indeed, the
counterfactual appears to be undefined, since the aether does not exist according to that
theory. Given that there is at least one counterfactual that is true in the context of Lorentz’s
aether theory that is not true (because undefined) in the context of QED, QED does not
stand in a relationship of counterfactual recovery to Lorentz’s aether theory, and so the
t-terms in that theory are not functionally realised.
One difficulty with [CR1], however, is that the question of which counterfactuals are
well-defined in the context of a theory and thus potentially true itself depends on putative
facts about functional realisation. Consider, for instance, the following counterfactual: if
the mass-energy distribution throughout spacetime had been different, then the curvature
of spacetime would have been different. In order to demonstrate that this counterfactual
is true according to some theory of QG, we must already be able to show that there is
something in that theory that can play the spacetime role. Otherwise, we won’t be able to
even formulate the counterfactual within the context of the relevant theory of QG, let alone
show that it is recoverable. But [CR1] is supposed to give content to the conditions under
which something plays the spacetime role in the first place. It cannot do that work in any
substantive fashion, however, if it already presupposes a way to establish functionalism.
To put the point another way, if [CR1] holds then we must already have established that
something in QG is sufficiently similar to an exact realiser of the spacetime role based on
some other notion of similarity, at which point [CR1] becomes otiose.
Perhaps this difficulty can be avoided by Ramsifying all of the counterfactuals as well.
Thus, we might take a counterfactual like “if the mass-energy distribution throughout
spacetime had been different, then the curvature of spacetime would have been different”
and replace any reference to t-terms like spacetime with free variables. Doing so yields the
following schematised counterfactual: “if the mass-energy distribution throughout x had
been different, then the curvature of x would have been different”. We can then repeat this
as needed for any further spatiotemporal notions, yielding a system of schematic counter-
factuals that are true according to GR.We can then say that so long as there is something in
QG that can be substituted in for the variables in these schematic counterfactuals to yield a
true instance, then there is an n-tuple in QG that is sufficiently similar to an exact realiser
of the spacetime role. Thus we can say that for a theory T with Ramsey sentence R:
Counterfactual Recovery 2 [CR2] A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities
⟨e′1...e′n⟩ that is sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩
would exactly realise the functional role specified by R just when every
schematised counterfactual that is true according to T is true according to T ′
and not vice versa.
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It is not clear that [CR2] will work for QED and Lorentz’s aether theory. Consider,
again, the counterfactual “if the aether had not existed, light waves would not have propa-
gated”. We can Ramsify this counterfactual by removing reference to the aether, replacing
it with a free variable, yielding “if x had not existed, light waves would not have prop-
agated”. The trouble, however, is that this schematised counterfactual might be true in
QED. Indeed, it might be made true by whatever realises spacetime.
Perhaps, however, it is just a matter of choosing the right counterfactual to make [CR2]
work. The right counterfactual will be one that, when schematised, cannot be filled in by
anything posited within QED. Such a schematised counterfactual will involve the aether
essentially, in this sense: only something that has the specific properties of the aether as
specified by the Ramsey sentence for the Lorentzian theory can be substituted back into
the schematised counterfactual to yield a true instance.
Unfortunately, we can always cook up a theory that contains a t-term for something
that is ‘counterfactually idle’, in this sense: every counterfactual involving the relevant
t-term is false. One way to do this is to add a t-term for something and stipulate that it
is extremely modally fragile, in this sense: it cannot survive any counterfactual change to
the world, and thus any counterfactual reasoning about the t-term is effectively blocked.
Alternatively, we could add a t-term and stipulate that it is extremely modally robust, in
this sense: it does not alter under any counterfactual variation to the world. So for instance,
we could introduce a version of GR, GR+, that contains an aether and then just stipulate
of the aether that it is not a difference-maker to the world. No matter how we change the
world, or how we change the aether, there is no follow-on effect that results from making
such a change. There is thus no counterfactual of the form ‘if the aether had not existed
then ... ’ that is true. Again such a theory might be a bad theory, but there doesn’t seem to
be anything stopping us from inventing a theory along these lines.
As with [XR], the capacity to formulate such a theory is trouble enough for [CR2]. For
such a theory will be counterfactually equivalent to GR, in this sense: every counterfactual
that is true in a form of GR+ where the aether is counterfactually idle, will be true in GR
as well and vice versa. That’s just because the only difference between the theories is the
aether, and the aether in GR+ leads to no new counterfactuals. This means that if a theory
of QG manages to satisfy [CR2] for GR, then it will satisfy it for GR+ as well, leading to
the functional realisation of the aether once again.
The problem of counterfactual indolence is a problem for [CR1] as well. [CR2], how-
ever, faces a second problem that is unique to that condition. Rather than adding an aether
to GR and stipulating that it is counterfactually idle, one could add the aether but imbue it
with properties in such a way that it is far too easy to satisfy the schematised counterfactu-
als that we go on to produce. So, for instance, one might formulate a theory where the only
counterfactuals that are true of the aether are like the schematised counterfactual above,
namely “if x had not existed, then light waves would not have propagated”. The trouble
with this counterfactual, as we saw, was that it is far too generic, running the risk that it
will be satisfied within a theory of QG. If all of the counterfactuals about the aether are
like this, then there won’t be a way to prevent the aether from being functionally realised
via [CR2].
Now, one might object that if the only counterfactuals that are true of the aether are,
when schematised, counterfactuals that can be satisfied by something in QG, then it is far
from clear that we should deny that the aether is functionally realised. To be clear, however,
the idea is not that the aether is defined solely in terms of the counterfactuals it supports.
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The aether is defined in terms of a Ramsey sentence, and the Ramsey sentence may at-
tribute all kinds of bizarre properties to the aether. When we end up saying that the aether
is realised, we are saying that something with these properties is functionally realised well-
enough. So while we are committing to the truth of the relevant generic counterfactuals,
the functionalist commitment goes beyond a commitment to the counterfactuals at issue.
That’s why the realisation of the aether is a problem. We are not just admitting that some-
thing that obeys certain counterfactuals is realised. We are saying that a specific kind of
entity—namely an aether, with its attended properties—is realised well enough by some
underlying theory.
If we set aside explanation and counterfactuals, are there any other options? One possi-
bility appeals to implication instead. Thus, one might say that for a theory T with Ramsey
sentence R:
Implication Condition [IC] A theory T ′ posits an n-tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩
that is sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of entities ⟨e1...en⟩ would ex-
actly realise the functional role specified byR in T just when T ′ implies T and
not vice versa.
[IC] preserves one aspect of Lewis’s approach to approximate realisation (introduced in
the previous section). One point in favour of [IC] is that there is a widely held expectation
that GR will be derivable from QG in some sense (cf. Crowther 2018). It is important,
however, to be clear about the nature of such derivability. As Butterfield and Isham (1999)
make clear, the kind of derivability expected in the case of QG and GR is one that permits
a certain degree of approximation. Indeed, this is already clear to some extent in the failure
of exact realisation discussed in §2. As noted there, in the case of some approaches to QG,
such as LQG, the metric structure of GR is only recoverable in an approximate sense. What
this means is that, using various mathematical approximation procedures, we can derive
numerical values that correspond very closely to certain solutions to the field equations.
What we cannot clearly do yet for every approach to QG is show that GR is a logical
consequence of the theory at issue.
One might concede that GR does not logically follow from QG in a strict sense but
instead focus on the mathematical approximation procedures involved in the kind of deriv-
ability at issue. Thus, we might modify [IC] into a more specific version of that condition
that focuses on mathematical approximation. Thus, for theory T with Ramsey sentenceR:
Mathematical Approximation Condition [MAC] A theory T ′ posits an n-
tuple of entities ⟨e′1...e′n⟩ that is sufficiently similar to whatever n-tuple of en-
tities ⟨e1...en⟩ would exactly realise the functional role specified by R just
when the mathematical structure of T can be approximated by the mathemat-
ical structure of T ′ and not vice versa.
The difficulty with [MAC], however, is that some account must be given of the relevant
notion of mathematical approximation. Mathematical approximation is another similarity
relation: we can approximate the mathematical structure of one theory with the mathemat-
ical structure of another theory to a greater or lesser extent. As was the case with [ER*] we
need a further account of this second similarity relation in order for [MAC] to do its job.
One option might be to build on a suggestion made by Butterfield and Isham (1999)
about approximation, and say that x mathematically approximates y when, by neglecting
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certain quantities, or ignoring certain degrees of freedom, we can reproduce the mathemat-
ical structure of y exactly. But this just shifts the bump in the carpet: which quantities and
degrees of freedom must we hold fixed? And how many quantities and how many degrees
of freedom can be neglected? We could just say ‘as much as possible, up to the point of
empirical recovery’ but that just brings us back to the problems with [ER] and [ER*]. Sim-
ilar considerations apply if we appeal to notions of explanatory recovery, counterfactual
recovery or implication. Perhaps there is some other way to specify how close a mathe-
matical approximation needs to be before we can say functional realisation occurs but it is
unclear what the relevant conditions might be.
At this point, I have run out of ideas for how we might specify the similarity relation
needed to make approximate spacetime functionalism work. We cannot obviously spec-
ify such a relation in empirical, explanatory, counterfactual, deductive or mathematical
terms. T-terms for unobservables are perhaps the most significant stumbling block toward
specifying a viable condition on similarity.
In §4, I will sketch out a way forward in light of this difficulty. Before doing so,
however, it is worth considering some objections to the discussion thus far. First, one
might worry that the challenge is simply a problem of my own making. Recall that, at
the end of §2, I reformulated Lewis’s conditions for approximate realisation. As we saw,
according to Lewis’s conditions, when the functional role specified by a Ramsey sentence
R for a theory T is not exactly satisfied, the t-terms in T are functionally realised so long
as there is a theory T ′ with Ramsey sentence R′ which specifies a functional role that is
exactly satisfied such that T ′ is a slightly modified or corrected version of T and T implies
T ′ but not vice versa. These conditions make no mention of a similarity relation between
the n-tuple that realises the role defined by R′ and the n-tuple that would realise the role
defined by R. Thus, if we use Lewis’s original conditions, one might argue, the challenge
discussed in this section simply does not arise.
But note that Lewis must explain how ‘slight’ a slight modification or correction to
a theory is supposed to be. An answer to this question would seem to require specifying
a similarity relation between theories. Since each of the conditions specified above is,
primarily, a relation between theories, these are the most plausible options for spelling out
what a slight modification is. Thus, Lewis might say that T is a slight modification of T ′
when T stands in a relation of empirical recovery to T ′. Or, he might say that T is a slight
modification of T ′ when everything that can be explained by T ′ can be explained by T
and on it goes. In the absence of some further option for specifying a similarity relation
between theories, it seems that the challenge raised here will apply equally well to Lewis’s
account of approximate realisation.
Second objection: it could be argued that the challenge I have raised in this section
is really a general challenge for approximate functionalism and not really a challenge for
approximate spacetime functionalism per se. The conditions I have formulated are, after
all, very general conditions, and they seem to fail on fairly general grounds. Whatever the
correct solution to the challenge turns out to be for other versions of approximate function-
alism, then, one can simply invoke that solution here too, as a way to develop approximate
spacetime functionalism.
There are two things to say here. First, even if the challenge is a general challenge, there
is still a need for a general solution that is applicable in the case of spacetime functionalism.
Without an answer to the challenge, it is unclear how tomake approximate functionalism of
any kind work, including approximate spacetime functionalism. Second, it is unclear that
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a solution to the challenge for the case of say, pain, can be straightforwardly transported
to the case of spacetime. It may turn out that the conditions under which approximate
functionalism is true are domain specific. Thus, the conditions under which pain or, indeed,
mental phenomena quite generally, get realised may differ from the conditions under which
spacetime is realised. It may be, then, that there is no general solution to the challenge,
despite the challenge being a general one. If that’s right, then a specific solution for the
case of spacetime is required.
The third objection focuses on the Ramsey-Lewis procedure used to specify function-
alism in the first place. One might object that specifying the functional role via a Ram-
sey sentence involves commitment to a specific form of functionalism, namely realiser
functionalism. According to realiser spacetime functionalism, spacetime is identified with
whatever plays the spacetime role. Realiser spacetime functionalism is to be contrasted
with role spacetime functionalism, according to which spacetime is identified with a spe-
cific higher-order property: namely, the property of a physical system being in some state
or other that realises the spacetime role. The challenge that I have outlined, one might
argue, is at best a challenge for a realiser version of approximate spacetime functionalism,
and so can be avoided by switching to role functionalism.
True enough, the Ramsey-Lewis procedure is commonly associated with realiser func-
tionalism. This is because, according to Lewis, the t-terms in a given theory T with Ramsey
sentence R denote the members of whichever n-tuple realises the functional role specified
byR. Thus, ‘spacetime’ just names a certain realiser. Lewis’s account of denotation, how-
ever, is not an essential feature of the broad Ramsification procedure. One can specify
a functional role in terms of a Ramsey sentence without committing to the further claim
that the t-terms in a theory denote whatever plays the functional role specified in this way.
Indeed, one can combine the Ramsey-Lewis picture with the claim that the t-terms de-
note a higher-order property of some physical system: namely, the system that is in a state
that plays the relevant functional role. Strictly speaking, there is no logical requirement
to adopt a particular account of the denotation of t-terms in combination with the Ramsi-
fication procedure. The challenge that I have raised targets the Ramsification procedure
and not Lewis’s account of the denotation of t-terms. Accordingly, the problem arises for
any form of functionalism that specifies functional roles in the relevant way, including role
functionalism.
Now, one might grant the point but blame the Ramsification procedure itself, rather
than realiser functionalism. One might argue that the challenge I have outlined only arises
if we adopt a Ramsey-Lewis approach to functionalism in the first place. In reality, how-
ever, the Ramsey-Lewis procedure is just a convenient framework for formulating the chal-
lenge. The challenge is likely to arise no matter how functionalism is specified, so long as
the functional role for spacetime is linked to GR. Regardless of how we specify the func-
tional role for spacetime in GR, it is likely that the metric structure of spacetime will be an
important part of that functional specification. Since the metric is, at best, approximated
within several approaches to QG, it is unlikely that the spacetime role will be exactly re-
alised. The challenge thus arises because of the importance of continuous metric structure
to spacetime in GR and the lack of continuous metric structure in some approaches to QG.
It has little to do with exactly how functional roles get specified.
Finally, one might object that the challenge I have raised is a result of focusing on a
specific account of the spacetime role, one that is tightly connected to GR. Shifting to an
alternative specification will alleviate the challenge by obviating the need for approximate
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spacetime functionalism. One might, for instance, follow Knox and specify the spacetime
role in inertial terms. Spacetime, according to Knox (2019), is anything that yields a struc-
ture of inertial frames. Alternatively, one might adopt an account of the spacetime role
that is focused on what Chalmers (forthcoming) calls ‘phenomenal space’. Which is to say
that we might try to link the spacetime role to our everyday concepts of space and time,
rather than to some theoretical concept in science. Another possibility is to focus on an
operational conception of spacetime, according to which the functional role for spacetime
is to provide a basis for measuring devices like clocks and rods.
I have nothing against these alternative approaches to spacetime functionalism. A dif-
ficulty emerges, however, once we are forced to try and select one as the correct account
of the spacetime role. For how are we supposed to make this decision? One option is to
rely on pre-theoretic intuitions about spacetime. But it is unclear how much weight we
should put on such intuitions in general and, besides, it is unclear that we even have robust
intuitions about the spacetime role in the first place. Another option might be to argue for
a particular spacetime role based on GR. The thought being that such and such a specifica-
tion of the spacetime role is correct because it is closest to some exact specification of the
spacetime role in GR. If we take this line, however, the challenge discussed in this section
is simply recreated at the level of functional roles. For now we have to specify how similar
a functional specification needs to be to the Ramsey sentence for GR before we can say
that it is the correct account of the spacetime role. Once again, it is unclear how to spell
out the relevant notion of similarity.
Of course, we can simply give up the idea that there is a ‘correct’ spacetime role and
just allow that there are multiple notions of spacetime, each with its own functional specifi-
cation. As Chalmers points out, if we go this way, then the question of what the functional
role for spacetime might be appears to be a largely terminological matter:
In practice this may end up as a largely verbal dispute, which we can resolve by
distinguishing multiple notions of spacetime. For example wemay distinguish
inertial spacetime and operational spacetime, and make the case that the theory
vindicates one but not the other. (Chalmers forthcoming)
To be clear, I don’t see any problem with specifying different conceptions of spacetime
in this manner. Recall, however, that spacetime functionalism was introduced as one way
to address a worry concerning empirical confirmation in the context of QG. If we shift our
focus away from Ramsifying GR, we are more or less conceding that there is nothing that
plays the spacetime role in that sense. What we need to work out, then, is whether if we
give up on even approximately satisfying the functional role as specified by the Ramsey
sentence for GR, we can still address lingering concerns regarding empirical confirmation.
My goal in the final section is to make a preliminary case for the affirmative, thereby
sidestepping the challenge facing approximate spacetime functionalism.
4. Functions not Functionalism
As noted, I do not see the challenge presented above as decisive. But nor am I sanguine
about the prospects for specifying a similarity relation that can then be used to underwrite
a viable form of approximate spacetime functionalism. I thus recommend giving up on the
functional realisation of spacetime, at least in so far as the functional role is tied to GR. As
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noted, this leaves open the possibility that spacetime in some other sense is functionally
realised, though here too we face the question of what the ‘correct’ spacetime role might
be, and no clear way to settle the matter.
What I recommend, instead, is that we focus on the functions of spacetime, rather
than on a complete functional specification of spacetime. Specifically, we should focus
on those functions of spacetime that play a role in grounding empirical observation and
confirmation. That’s because, as discussed in §1, the appeal to spacetime functionalism in
QG is motivated by the need to establish the empirical coherence of specific theories. If
we can show that the functions of spacetime that support observation and confirmation are
performed by something in QG, then that is sufficient to address any concerns one might
have regarding empirical incoherence.
Specifically, I recommend rejecting the assumption, freely granted in §1 of this paper,
that observation is essentially tied to location in spacetime. If observation is essentially
tied to location in spacetime then, clearly, for a given approach to QG to be empirically
coherent, spacetime must be recovered. But if we give up the connection, then there is less
pressure to ensure that spacetime is recovered. This is not to say that we should sever the
tie between observation and location. The thought, rather, is that location in the context of
observation need not be spatiotemporal location. What we need for observation to occur
is just for entities to be located in some meaningful sense.
The point can be put in terms of a more general function, that I will call the location
function. One of the things that spacetime does, is provide locations for entities. There
are, however, other kinds of structures that are capable of providing locations for entities.
Spacetime is just one structure among many that is capable of doing this kind of work. An
absolute structure of space and time, for instance, can also perform the location function,
which is why it is meaningful to say that entities are located in a Newtonian world. More
generally, any structure that can be modelled either exactly or approximately by an n-tuple
of geometrical objects defined over a manifold, including discrete geometric structures
(such as those described in Brass et al. (2005); Chen (2014)), has the potential to perform
the location function.
Note that this is not a complete specification of the location function. It is, at best, a
sufficient condition for performing the function (and one that I offer tentatively; as I note
belowwe likely need input from physics to settle thematter). If something along these lines
is right, however, then the location function is quite broad. In particular, while it is tied to
geometry, it is not tied to spacetime. To see this, consider a geometric colour space (see, for
instance, Logvinenko (2015); Griffin and Mylonas (2019); Provenzi (2020)). Such a space
allows us to specify the distance between colours, and consider smooth transformations
from one colour to another. On the geometric conception of location, a colour space also
provides genuine locations for colours within that space. Such colour locations are not,
however, spatial, temporal or spatiotemporal in nature.
When it comes to concerns about empirical coherence, then, we only need to ensure that
one of the functions that spacetime performs—that of locating entities in the above general
sense—is performed by something. We can thus avoid difficult questions about what it
takes to functionally realise spacetime by focusing, directly, on the location function in
this way. Indeed, whether it is spacetime that performs the function of locating entities
or something else matters much less than whether the function is performed at all. In the
case of LQG, for instance, a discrete geometry defined directly over the spinfoam structure
may perform the location function even if that geometry ultimately lacks spatiotemporal
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properties.
Of course, in order to accommodate the impressive empirical results that confirm GR,
we must recover a notion of location that at least approximates spatiotemporal locations
within the regime where GR is successful. It is, however, important to disentangle the
empirical adequacy of a given approach to QG from any worries about empirical incoher-
ence. Granted, the two issues are logically related in the following sense: an approach to
QG cannot be empirically adequate without being empirically coherent. But the reverse is
not true: in so far as bare empirical coherence is concerned any viable picture of location
will do.7
At the end of the previous section I noted that there are ways of defining a functional
role for spacetime that don’t involve Ramsifying GR. One might worry, then, that my pro-
posal is really just a version of one of these other approaches. By focusing on a particular
function of spacetime—namely, that of providing locations—onemight object, I am simply
adopting a particular understanding of what spacetime is, and thus endorsing some brand
of spacetime functionalism after all.
I concede that what it takes to support location may require the presence of structures
that realise some of the other spacetime roles that have been specified in the literature.
So if one wants to say that spacetime in some sense is functionally realised, then so be
it. What I want to emphasise, however, is that the functional realisation of spacetime is
entirely optional, at least in so far as empirical coherence is concerned. There is no need to
agree on a particular conception of spacetime, and there is no need to say anything about
what the functional role for spacetime might be. The advantage of my approach is that we
don’t need to engage in a further debate over spacetime functionalism for the purposes of
understanding how a given approach to QG can be empirically coherent.
The proposal does assume, however, that there is good sense to be made of location in
non-spatiotemporal terms. So how should we understand the non-spatiotemporal notion
of location at issue? That, I submit, is a matter for physics. Whatever non-spatiotemporal,
physical structure is needed for an approach to QG, that is the structure that we should
take to yield locations for entities and thus ultimately ground empirical coherence and
confirmation. In a certain sense, then, the approach I am advocating is an instance of
the ‘top down’ approach to empirical coherence ultimately recommended by Huggett and
Wüthrich (2013, pp. 284–285). Roughly speaking, a ‘bottom up’ approach to the issue
involves coming to QG with a pre-defined understanding of what empirical confirmation
requires, and then taking a theory to task for failing to satisfy that understanding. In a ‘top
down’ approach, by contrast, we allow that a theory might revise the way we understand
empirical coherence, and thus that the theorymay be empirically coherent by its own lights.
I am recommending a ‘top down’ approach to (at least) location: we should allow that our
understanding of location might be updated by a new physical theory and, in this way, that
the theory may secure empirical coherence on its own terms.
7Even if we focus on empirical adequacy, it is not obvious that we need to recover spacetime. All we
need to show is that there is something in a theory of QG that is empirically indistinguishable from spacetime
under certain conditions. I suppose one could take the view that if x and y are empirically indistinguishable,
then x just is y, in which case the recovery of spacetime is a requirement after all. But this would be to adopt
an extremely strong positivist condition on identity, one that is difficult to defend. In a similar vein, one
might argue that empirical indistinguishability is sufficient for functional realisation, and so the realisation
of spacetime is required after all. This, however, is to commit to something like [ER] or [ER*] which, as we
have seen, are not very plausible conditions on functional realisation.
20
That being said, I suspect that we may need to use philosophy as a basis for specifying
some very general constraints on the nature of location, at least as a starting point for inter-
preting physics. Such constraints likely include structural features like distance, contiguity
and coincidence relations. This suggests a method of reflective equilibrium, whereby we
start with a philosophical understanding of location and of the location function and al-
low that our physical theories update that understanding to a certain extent, but only up
to a point. When our physical theories recommend altering the conception of location so
dramatically that the notion is no-longer recognisable as location in the barest sense, we
can take that as a cue to rework our understanding of the physical theories at issue. By
working back and forth between philosophy and physics in this way, we can produce an
understanding of location that supports empirical coherence in the absence of spacetime.
Given a ‘top down’ approach along these lines, the question of how a given theory
manages to locate entities can really only be determined on a theory-by-theory basis. Some
of the work that spacetime functionalists have already completed is relevant here. Lam and
Wüthrich, for instance, argue that in the approach to QG discussed briefly in §2—LQG—
there is something that plays the ‘localising function’ of spacetime. This localising function
accords with what I have called the location function. Here’s what they say about the LQG
case:
The ‘localizing function’ ... involves at its core the notions of coincidence and
contiguity: the functional role of localizing a physical entity (what it means
for a physical entity to be localized) crucially involves coincidence and conti-
guity relations. As a consequence, in schematic terms, the second step (FR-2)
crucially involves how LQG entities (or LQG properties) can instantiate coin-
cidence and contiguity relations in an appropriate context. (Lam andWüthrich,
2018, p. 48)
They go on to demonstrate that in LQG there is reason to think that spin-networks can
fill the location function by giving rise to coincidence and contiguity relations. They take
this to be a step along the road to spacetime functionalism, and thus ultimately as part
of their demonstration that spacetime metric structure is functionally realised in QG. If
we set these functionalist ambitions aside, however, then we can just rest easy with the
location function itself. In which case Lam and Wüthrich’s demonstration that something
performs the function of locating entities in LQG is already enough to address concerns
about empirical coherence. As they put the point, “no unfinished business lingers on” (Lam
and Wüthrich, 2018, p. 44) but not because spacetime is functionally realised. Rather, the
job is done so long as something performs the function of locating entities.
5. Conclusion
It is time to take stock. I have presented a challenge for a version of spacetime functional-
ism that anchors the spacetime role to GR. The challenge is to provide a set of realisation
conditions that can accommodate the fact that the spacetime role is unlikely to be exactly
realised in at least some approaches to QG. This, in turn, involves providing an account
of how similar something must be to an exact realiser of the spacetime role before we are
permitted to say that functional realisation occurs. I considered a number of options for
specifying a viable notion of similarity, and found them all wanting. I went on to suggest
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a way forward: give up on the realisation of the spacetime role. Look, instead, at certain
functions of spacetime, namely those implicated in observation and confirmation, with an
eye to explaining how these functions can be performed by something in a given theory of
QG. I focused, in particular, on a location function, suggesting that if the location function
is satisfied then empirical observation is possible. If that’s right, however, then the discus-
sion of spacetime functionalism in QG is useful as a way to highlight the importance of
location, but it is ultimately location that we should be seeking to understand. At present,
however, we don’t really understand location all that well, and nor do we have a general
account of the relationship between location on the one hand, and empirical confirmation
and observation on the other. What location is, and how it works, emerges as an important
topic for scientifically informed philosophical investigation.
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